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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE RECORD ON APPEAL DEMONSTRATES THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT, CONTRARY TO THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
SURROUNDING DEDICATION AND ABANDONMENT, ERRED 
BY DEEMING TRESPASSERS TO BE MEMBERS OF THE 
PUBLIC WHOSE USE COULD AND DID RIPEN INTO A 
PUBLIC WAY. 
Both the State and Utah County argue that the trial court 
correctly determined users of the Bennie Creek Road to be members 
of the public in support of the ruling that it was dedicated and 
abandoned to the public use. The record on appeal, however, 
demonstrates otherwise. 
A. Preservation of Trespass Issue. 
Contrary to the assertions of both the State and Utah County 
that the trespass issue was not preserved, the record is riddled 
with testimony elicited throughout the trial concerning the 
trespass issue vis-a-vis the requisite elements of dedication 
(see, e.g., R. 1639:71-72; R. 1644:941:3-18; R. 1646:1197-98, et 
seq.) . The fact that the trial court not only understood but 
considered the trespass issue, whether by way of criminal or 
common law, is demonstrated by the following statement and query 
by the trial court to counsel for Utah County during closing 
arguments: 
THE COURT: There seems some confusion as I've compared 
and contrasted all of the witnesses, and I 
counted 49 and 16 -- 65 witnesses. As I've 
charted it all out and looked carefully at 
1 
what they've all said, one of the areas that 
there seems to be some confusion over is 
exactly where the Forest Service property 
started. Some people said there was a fence, 
some people said there was a sign. Other 
people said, "Well, it started after the last 
fence." I think one witness said it started 
right after the last home on the lane and 
others said it was three or four miles up, 
and many of them described traveling the road 
to camp in certain areas, and those areas 
certainly sound like places on the Evans or 
Poulsen property or places to the east of the 
Forest Service property. So if people 
traveled this road to trespass any private 
land, even unintentionally, is that still an 
appropriate and public use of the land? 
(See R. 1646:1168-69) (emphasis added) . In light of the foregoing 
citations, the trespass issue was not only raised in a timely 
fashion but it was supported by evidence or relevant legal 
authority. See Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, 1[56, 102 P. 3d 
774, cert, granted, 123 P.3d 815 (Utah 2005). 
B. Inapplicability of Marshaling Requirement. 
Both the State and Utah County argue that the marshaling 
requirement applies to the trespass issue. They both ignore, 
however, the following applicable standard of review to be applied 
in the instant case: "When reviewing a trial court's decision 
regarding whether a public highway has been established . . . , 
[the appellate court] review[s] the decision for correctness but 
grant [s] the court significant discretion in its application of 
the facts to the statute." Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 
2 
307, 310 (Utah 1997) . Moreover, it is well-established that the 
trial court's application, or lack thereof, of the law is a legal 
determination reviewed for correction of error. State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) (when reviewing "a trial court's 
determination of the law[,] . . . [an] appellate court decides the 
matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial 
judge's determination of law"); see also AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 
2005 UT App 168, %B, 112 P.3d 1228. 
C. By Refusing to Apply Common Law Trespass 
Principles to the Requisite Elements of 
Dedication/ the Trial Court Not Only 
Impermissibly Relieved Plaintiffs of Their 
Burden But It Ignored the Presumption to be 
Employed in Favor of the Property Owners. 
In the course of arguing the trespass issue, the State and 
Utah County ignore well-established legal principles underlying 
the dedication and abandonment of private property to the public 
use. According to those well-established legal principles, the 
State and Utah County, as Plaintiffs, had the burden to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that those traveling the Bennie 
Creek Road were not trespassers. See Draper City v. Estate of 
Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099, 1100 (Utah 1995); Campbell v. Box 
Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); cf. Leo M. 
Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211, 213 (Utah 1981) 
(quoting Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 143, 417 P. 2d 646, 648 
3 
(1966)). By refusing to apply common law trespassing principles 
to the requisite elements of dedication, the trial court 
impermissibly relieved the State and Utah County of their burden 
to prove dedication by clear and convincing evidence and thereby 
shifted the burden to the Appellants, as property owners, to prove 
otherwise. Further, the trial court's refusal to apply the law of 
trespass ignored the well-established presumption to be employed 
in favor of property owners, which is due to the high-degree of 
sanctity and respect of property ownership. Cf. Draper City, 888 
P.2d at 1099; Campbell, 962 P.2d at 808. 
II. THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
MISINTERPRETED AND MISAPPLIED THE UNDERLYING 
LAW OF "CONTINUOUS USE" AS IT PERTAINS TO 
DEDICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE BY CONCLUDING 
THAT THE BENNIE CREEK ROAD HAD BEEN 
CONTINUOUSLY USED BY THE PUBLIC. 
The State argues that the trial court correctly interpreted 
and applied the law of ''continuous use" in the instant case. See 
Brief of Appellee Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, p. 18. In 
conjunction with its argument, the State argues that Appellants 
failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings pertaining to its conclusion that the Bennie Creek Road 
was continuously used for a period of ten years. Id. at 19-24. 
The State wholly misconstrues the "continuous use" argument of 
Appellants and, in turn, applies the wrong standard of review. 
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A, Inapplicability of Marshaling Requirement. 
As set forth in their Brief, Appellants argue that the trial 
court misinterpreted and misapplied the law surrounding the 
"continuous use" requirement as it pertains to dedication and 
abandonment of private property to the public use. See Brief of 
Appellants, pp. 23-27. A trial court's interpretation or 
application of law, whether statutory or otherwise, is a question 
of law reviewed by the appellate court for correction of error, 
giving no deference to the trial court. See Rushton v. Salt Lake 
County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 
P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992); cf. Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman 
Fin., Inc., 974 P.2d 288, 295 (Utah 1999). 
B. The Law Pertaining to "Continuous Use", Which 
the Trial Court Misinterpreted and Misapplied 
in the Instant Case. 
Three elements or factors must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence for a private road to be dedicated for public 
use pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104: uxthere must be (i) 
continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period 
of ten years.'" Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 
P.2d 307, 310 (Utah 1997)). For the "continuous use" element to 
be properly established, the public must have "made a continuous 
and uninterrupted use . . . as often as they found it convenient 
5 
or necessary.'' Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 107, 109 
(1958). "[U]se may be continuous though not constant . . . . 
provided it occurred as often as the claimant had occasion or 
chose to pass. Mere intermission is not interruption." Richards 
v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977) (citation 
omitted). Consequently, "under the continuous use requirement, 
members of the public must have been able to use the road whenever 
they found it necessary or convenient." Campbell, 962 P. 2d at 
809. 
In the case at bar, the trial court readily acknowledged that 
use of the Bennie Creek Road was interrupted "by naturally 
occurring conditions such as groundwater (spring water) in wet 
years and snow in the winter." (R. 1470). Moreover, the trial 
court conceded in its Memorandum Decision that witnesses at trial 
testified "that there were locked gates on the road." (R. 1469). 
In fact, the trial court mentioned that "[t]here was testimony 
regarding four gates on the Benny [sic] Creek road between U.S. 
Highway 89 and the Uintah National Forest." (R. 1465) (Emphasis 
added). Even more pointedly, the trial court stated, "Virgil 
Neeves testified that between 1958 and 1980 there was a locked 
gate near the Gardner home (the last home traveling west toward 
6 
the forest service property, now occupied by Defendant Randy 
Butler) which was locked most of the time." (R. 1467-68).1 
Additionally, the trial court, in its Memorandum Decision, 
specifically noted that Mr. Mike Condley, who had lived in the 
area from 1970 until 1979, "firmly recalled a locked gate near the 
Gardner (Butler) home." (R. 1468). Shortly thereafter in its 
Decision, the trial court also acknowledged that Defendant Blaine 
Evans and others put the locked gates farther west, near the 
present cattle guard between the Butler home and forest service 
property." (R. 14 67). 
In addition to the gates, the trial court conceded that there 
"was substantial testimony about ["no trespassing"] signs along 
the road" and other locations "designating the area as private 
property." (R. 1466; see also R. 1639:39:7-12; R. 1639:55:9-12; R. 
1639:71-72; R. 1640:232-33; R. 1640:287:3-7; R. 1640:347:4-21; R. 
1640:378:16-21; R. 1641:509:9-17; R. 1642:709:16). Further, the 
Appellants, as landowners, called the county sheriff to have 
various individuals removed from their property, as trespassers 
(see, e.g., R. 1645:1073:11-17; see also R. 1466). 
!The trial court also noted that Mr. Neeves "saw people stuck on 
the road and recalls a cable across the road to stop cars." The 
trial court, however, without explanation, refused to consider this 
testimonial evidence, characterizing it as "simply confused and 
inconsistent with all of the other testimony about obstructions on 
the road in question." (R. 1468). 
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Travel to the Forest Service land by way of the Bennie Creek 
Road was also precluded by what was commonly referred to as a bog 
in the road, which was the result of springs or ditches (R. 1462). 
This bog, according to the record, made travel on the Bennie Creek 
Road difficult, if not impossible, during "certain seasons or 
certain times between 1925 and 1980" (R. 1462) . 
Further, the unrebutted testimony at trial established that 
the road "is periodically used to deliver irrigation water to 
property along the road and that when that occurs, the road 
becomes impassable." (R. 1466),2 According to testimony, the road 
was used from 1950 through 1993 as the irrigation ditch to 
transport water to the property owners' pastures on both sides of 
the road (R. 1644:944:17-25; R. 1644:970:6-9). The testimony at 
trial established that "about every three weeks" the road would be 
utilized for irrigation purposes "[f]or approximately six days" at 
a time (R. 1644:974:11-20). 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the trial court found that 
"neither the Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach) families used 
that method of irrigation covering a period from 1925 to 1981." 
(R. 1466; R. 1518, %18) . Appellants acknowledge that to 
successfully challenge this particular finding, the appellant 
2As previously noted in the Brief of Appellants, the irrigation 
practices of the landowners were performed pursuant to "diligence 
rights" established in 1850 (R. 1645:1093:1-4). 
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"must marshal the evidence in support of the finding[] and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
finding[] [is] so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence,' thus making [it] 'clearly erroneous.'" 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998) (citations 
omitted). However, there is no evidence in the record to marshal 
in support of the aforementioned finding. Hence, in light of the 
aforementioned testimony and citations to the record, the trial 
court's finding is clearly erroneous. 
In this case, the trial court misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. 
§ 72-5-104 and misapplied the underlying legal principles of the 
statute pertaining to the elements of "continuous use" as a 
"public thoroughfare" when it determined that the Bennie Creek 
Road was in continuous use by the public as a public thoroughfare. 
III. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 
REFUSING TO SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFY THE 
REQUISITE TEN-YEAR PERIOD OF TIME OF 
CONTINUOUS USE AS DICTATED BY THE DEDICATION 
STATUTE. 
The State argues that the trial court correctly followed the 
dedication statute and was not required to specifically identify 
a ten-year period of time of continuous use. See Brief of 
Appellee Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, p. 24-25. As part 
of this argument, the State asserts that there is no legal 
9 
authority requiring the trial court to specifically identify a 
ten-year period of time of continuous use. Id. at p. 25. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1), requires continuous use by the 
public for ten years before private property can be dedicated or 
abandoned to the public use. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) 
(2001); Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P. 2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). However, the trial court, in the instant case, 
refused to specifically identify such a ten-year period of time. 
In the case at bar, the trial court concluded that "the 
evidence is clear and convincing that for at least 10 years prior 
to 1958 the road was open and traveled by the public as often as 
necessary or convenient ." (R. 1470). The trial court 
stated that 
even if it is concluded (which this Court 
does not) that the road was gated and locked 
in the late 50fs and early 60's as described 
by the Butlers, the road was used as 
necessary and convenient by the public for 
more than 10 years before that time and, 
again, 10 years after that time. 
(R. 1461; see also R. 1515, 1[28) . 
In Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P. 2d 1097 (Utah 
1995) , Draper City and several individuals, as Plaintiffs, brought 
an action seeking declaration that a private road had been 
dedicated and abandoned to public use on the ground that it had 
been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of 
10 
ten years. Id. at 1098. The trial court granted summary judgment 
for Plaintiffs, which Defendants appealed. Id. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "neither 
[Plaintiffs], the trial court in its findings, nor we have been 
able to pinpoint any ten-year period during which public use, as 
we have defined it, of the full length of the road is undisputed. 
Continuous use for ten years is required by section 27-12-89 [the 
predecessor statute to Utah Code Ann. 72-5-104]." Id. at 1100. 
Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded the 
case for further proceedings consistent with the its opinion. Id. 
at 1101. 
Similarly, the trial court in the instant case failed to 
specifically pinpoint a ten-year period of time as required by the 
dedication statute. By refusing to specifically identify the ten-
year period, the trial court both misinterpreted and misapplied 
the dedication statute. In so doing, the trial court 
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to Appellants, as 
landowners. Cf. Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 
639 P.2d 211, 213 (Utah 1981) (quoting Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 
2d 140, 143, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (1966)). This failure by the trial 
court also ignored the presumption to be employed in favor of the 
Appellants, as landowners. Id. Moreover, the trial court's 
refusal to pinpoint the requisite ten-year period of time of 
11 
continuous use is an impermissible effort to shift the burden of 
such a determination to the reviewing court, as a depository in 
which the burden and determination is then to be performed. On 
this basis alone is a reversal and remand warranted. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
FAILING TO CONSIDER AND RULE ON DEFENDANTS7 
OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW# AND ORDER. 
The State argues that the trial court "was within its 
discretion when it ruled3 on Appellants' objection to the proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order." See Brief of 
Appellee Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, p. 25. This 
argument is seriously flawed for, at least, three reasons. 
The State argues that Defendants' Objection was untimely 
because it was not filed on August 9, 2004. See id. at p. 26. 
However, Defendants' Objection was initially submitted to the 
court by facsimile on August 9, 2004, with the original being 
filed the next day on August 10, 2004. This is substantiated by 
the Certificates of Service to opposing counsel, certifying that 
a true and correct copy of the Objection was forwarded by both 
facsimile and First-Class Mail on August 9, 2004 (See R. 1480-81) . 
3Contrary to the State's representation, the trial court at no 
time ruled on or even addressed Defendants' Objection to the Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prior to signing the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on August 16, 2004. 
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Both the State and Utah County were aware of the foregoing, which 
is further demonstrated by the failure of the State and Utah 
County to raise this issue in their Response to Defendants' 
Objection filed on August 16, 2004 (R. 1487-1503). In the event 
that an untimeliness argument had existed, it was effectively 
waived by failure of the State and Utah County to raise it their 
aforementioned Response. 
The trial court's ruling on a the post-trial motion or 
objection to proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
order is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Child v. Gonda, 
972 P.2d 425, 428 (Utah 1998); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 
(Utah 1994) (stating that u[a]t the extreme end of the discretion 
spectrum would be a decision by the trial court to grant or deny 
a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence."). On June 
16, 2004, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision, 
concluding that the Bennie Creek Road had been dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
72-5-104 and its predecessor statute, Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89. 
Thereafter, counsel for the State and Utah County submitted 
proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
Defendants filed an Objection to the proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and requested oral argument. 
Plaintiffs responded to Defendants' Objection and opposed the 
13 
request for oral argument and, in the alternative, requested an 
expedited hearing in addition to their request for attorney fees. 
With their response, Plaintiffs, on August 16, 2004, filed a 
Notice to Submit for Decision. Notwithstanding, the trial court, 
that same day, without hearing or explanation, signed the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider 
and specifically rule on Defendants' substantial objections 
challenging the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order, for, among other things, insufficiency of the evidence. 
ARGUMENTS IN RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPEAL 
I. UTAH COUNTY IS ESTOPPED FROM RAISING ON 
CROSS-APPEAL THE TRIAL COURT'S ALLEGED 
FAILURES TO CONSIDER THE GATE AS AN 
"INSTALLATION" DUE TO ITS FAILURE TO PRESERVE 
THIS ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT, 
Utah County, as Cross-Appellant, claims now, for the first 
time on appeal, that the trial court incorrectly considered 
whether the gate was locked or unlocked rather than consider the 
gate as an "installation" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-
104(1). Moreover, Utah County failed to provide in its statement 
of the issues presented the requisite citation to the record 
showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court. See Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A) ("[t]he brief of the appellant shall 
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contain . . . a citation to the record showing that the issue was 
preserved in the trial court . . . . " ) ; cf. Brief of Appellee / 
Cross-Appellant Utah County, pp. 2-3. 
Absent plain error or exceptional circumstances, which Utah 
County did not argue, the appellate court "will not consider an 
issue -- even a constitutional issue -- which is raised for the 
first time on appeal." Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, f56, 102 
P.3d 774, cert, granted, 123 P.3d 815 (Utah 2005) (citing Utah R. 
App. P. 24(j); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991)). An issue is properly raised in the trial court if 
the issue is raised in a timely fashion, the issue is specifically 
raised, and the issue is supported by evidence or relevant legal 
authority. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 
(Utah 1998); see also Smith v. Hales & Warner Construction, Inc., 
2005 UT App 38, ^2 n.l, 107 P.3d 701, cert, denied, 123 P.3d 815 
(Utah 2005); 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, 2004 UT 72, f51, 99 
P. 3d 801 (quoting Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 
2002 UT 48, fl4, 48 P.3d 968 (u'[I]n order to preserve an issue 
for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the trial court in 
such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that 
issue.7" (alternations in original)). Utah County fails in this 
regard on all counts. Consequently, this Court should decline to 
address Utah County's argument on cross-appeal. 
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II. UTAH COUNTY' S INSUFFICIENCY-OF-THE-EVIDENCE 
CHALLENGE ON CROSS-APPEAL FAILS BECAUSE IT 
FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AND 
DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
As part of its cross-appeal, Utah County argues that the 
trial court's determination concerning whether the gate was locked 
or unlocked was against the weight of the evidence. See Brief of 
Appellee / Cross-Appellant Utah County, pp. 33-37. In its 
statement of the issues of its brief, Utah County conceded that 
"[t]he standard of review for this issue is clearly erroneous 
because this issue is a question of fact." 
"To successfully challenge an ultimate finding of fact, xan 
appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the 
finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in the 
light most favorable to the court below.'" Parduhn v. Bennett, 
2005 UT 22, 1(25, 112 P. 3d 495 (quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 
82, 1(76, 100 P.3d 1177 (internal quotations omitted)). On appeal, 
an appellant "must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
support the very findings the appellant resists." Chen, 2004 UT 
82 at 1(77 (internal quotations omitted) ; AWINC Corp. v Simonsen, 
2005 UT App 168, HlO, 112 P.3d 1228. "A challenge to an ultimate 
finding of fact is tantamount to a claim that there are 
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insufficient subsidiary facts to support that finding." In turn, 
"a challenge to a subsidiary finding is really a challenge to the 
ultimate finding it supports. A party challenging a subsidiary 
finding must therefore marshal evidence in support of the ultimate 
finding." Parduhn, 2005 UT 22 at 25. 
Utah County failed to properly marshal the evidence to show, 
among other things, that the trial court's findings are not 
supported by the evidence. Rather, Utah County merely provided an 
incomplete list of evidence supporting the factual findings and 
then argues that the findings are not supported by the weight of 
the evidence. Utah County not only failed to provide a 
comprehensive list, but it also failed to "ferret out a fatal flaw 
in the evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Jnv. Co., 818 P.2d 
1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants Randy Butler, Donna 
Butler, Blaine Evans, and Linda Evans, respectfully request that 
this Court reverse the trial court's determination that Bennie 
Creek Road was dedicated and abandoned to the public use and 
remand the case to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this Court's instructions as set forth in its 
opinion. Further, Defendants, as Cross-Appellees, respectfully 
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request that this Court refuse to consider Utah County's cross-
appeal for the reasons specifically stated above or any other 
reason that the Court deems appropriate under the circumstances. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of January, 2006. 
WTGGINS, P.C. 
S c o t t L JWiggij/s 
*ys f^ajL-Sppellants 
and C r o s s ^ A p p e l l e e s 
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I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused 
to be mailed by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true 
and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS / 
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEES to each of the following on this 25th day 
of January, 2006: 
Mr. M. Cort Griffin 
Mr. Robert J. Moore 
Deputy Utah County Attorneys 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2400 
Provo, UT 84 606 
Counsel for Utah County 
Mr. Martin B. Bushman 
Assistant Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 2110 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Counsel for State of Utah, Department of 
Natural R&&&U£*ces^ Division of Wildlife 
Resource 
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ADDENDA 
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24 (a) (11) and inasmuch as the documents referred to 
herein are set forth in the Addendum attached to the previously 
filed Brief of Appellants. 
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